TSB finds 'series of safety deficiencies' after tour boat groundsMay 4, 2020 04:31 PM
Island Queen III was holed and took on water during a 2018 cruise on the St. Lawrence River
Damage to the port propeller and rudder on Island Queen III.
The following is text of a news release from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB):
(GATINEAU, Quebec) — The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has published its investigation report (M17C0179) into the August 2017 bottom contact of the passenger vessel Island Queen III near Whiskey Island off Kingston, Ontario. The board is issuing three safety concerns relating to carriage of life jackets, the evacuation of passengers during an emergency, and specialized training for crewmembers who are responsible to manage passengers during an emergency.
In the early afternoon of Aug. 8, 2017, the passenger vessel Island Queen III left port for a planned three-hour cruise in the Thousand Islands area of the St. Lawrence River, sailing out of Kingston, Ontario, with 290 people on board. Almost immediately after departing, the vessel encountered three separate fleets of local sailing school dinghies, causing it to deviate from the planned route. As the vessel moved through a narrow portion of the route, it strayed into shallow water and struck bottom, breaching the hull and causing water to flood a compartment below the main deck. The vessel remained afloat and returned to the dock about 30 minutes later. There were no injuries.
The investigation determined that the impact of the contact caused a breach measuring approximately 30 centimeters (12 inches) in the vessel’s hull below the waterline. It also caused the port engine to stall and the port rudder to jam. While the crew inspected the vessel for damage, the master steered back onto the planned course, restarted the port engine, and turned the vessel back toward Kingston. Below deck, water flooded the steering compartment. Within minutes, the crew started a bilge pump, but quickly resorted to using buckets to bail water from the steering compartment. Halfway back to Kingston, the water in the compartment was approximately 60 cm (2 feet) deep and, by the time the vessel docked and passengers began disembarking, the water level had reached approximately 1.4 meters (4.5 feet).
The investigation uncovered a series of safety deficiencies in respect to responding to emergencies on board passenger vessels, which led the board to issue three safety concerns.
Availability of sufficient life jackets for all children and infants on board
Every vessel more than 5 gross tonnage and certified to carry more than 12 passengers is required, by Transport Canada (TC), to carry a life jacket for each member of the complement. In addition, vessels must carry children’s life jackets for at least 10 percent of the maximum complement – or one for each child on board, whichever is greater. Island Queen III carried 31 child-sized life jackets, 10 percent of its maximum complement. However, there were as many as 32 children, as well as four infants, on board. The master and crew were unaware of the number of children and infants on board, as there was no procedure in place to determine and record these numbers. There is also no Canadian requirement for vessels to carry any life jackets for infants. Therefore, the board is concerned that:
• Without TC requirements for the carriage of infant-sized life jackets on board vessels, and requirements for vessel operators to ensure the number of child and infant-sized life jackets on board equals or exceeds the number of children and infants on board, there remains a risk that vessels may not have a sufficient number of suitably sized life jackets for children and infants.
Development and oversight of vessel-specific evacuation procedures
Island Queen III, like all passenger vessels, was required to have a procedure for evacuating all passengers and crewmembers within 30 minutes of an abandon-ship signal. The investigation revealed that there was no procedure in place at the time of the occurrence. TC, which is responsible for overseeing compliance, does not have formal procedures in place to verify compliance with this requirement. Therefore, the board is concerned that:
• Until TC implements a formal validation and approval process for passenger vessel evacuation procedures, crews and passengers may not be prepared to evacuate safely in an emergency.
Training in passenger safety management for crewmembers on passenger vessels carrying more than 12 passengers
The current regulations related to this type of training are based on vessel size and the type of voyage, irrespective of the number of passengers on board. Although smaller vessels, such as Island Queen III, may be certified to carry dozens or hundreds of people, the crewmembers are not required to be trained in passenger safety management. Therefore, the board is concerned that:
• Until the crews of these vessels are required to take the appropriate passenger safety management training, there remains a risk that crewmembers will not be adequately prepared in emergencies.
Safety action taken
Since this incident, the operator of Island Queen III has undertaken a number of steps to improve safety by addressing some of the identified deficiencies, including changing how the pre-departure safety briefing is given to passengers, and having crewmembers demonstrate how to put on life jackets. The company has also reviewed its safety management system and developed detailed evacuation procedures. However, today’s safety concerns are also directed to the commercial passenger vessel industry at large, and to TC.
See the investigation page for more information.Edit Module